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Abstract 
The emergence of China's economy and military vis-a-vis US's strategy to regain its hegemony has shifted the 
global political constellation focus to the Southeast Asia region. The recent circumstance in the South China Sea 
followed by the intensification of the Indo-Pacific strategy, has not only, forcefully put the Southeast Asia region 
as a theater of China-US geopolitical rivalry, but also increasingly set the complexity of problems to the region. 
Responding to this context, on June 23, 2019, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific as foreign 
policy guidance for its member-states, including Indonesia as an initiator. The objective of this paper is to 
discuss Indonesia's strategy beyond the ASEAN Outlook. Theoretical framework of regional security complex 
and regional governance used in explaining the security architecture and political contestation among Southeast 
Asian countries, and how it influences their stances in ASEAN’s role as regional governance within its political 
mechanism in downplaying Indo-Pacific Strategy. Strategy theory used to analyze how Indonesia develop its 
strategy to initiate and promote the Outlook beyond its rational interest. Indonesia's role in the initiation and 
promotion of the ASEAN Outlook is played within the normative framework to upholding persistent regional 
stability and collective balancing towards the cogency of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Consequently, this condition 
impels a necessity for Indonesia to build its defense capability without setting aside the free and active policy.     
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1. Introduction 
Terminology of Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical construction emerged from the remarks of Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 about the Indian and Pacific as the ocean of freedom and prosperity (Abe, 2007). 
China and India seaward-oriented foreign policy and United States' vision which can not separate India from its 
security architecture has driven the US to begin developing its own Indo-Pacific concept (Yoshihara, 2013; Kuo, 
2018). In August 2016, the Japanese Prime Minister introduced "Free and Open Indo-Pacific/FOIP”  (Kitaoka, 
2019). This strategy was quickly accepted and adopted by US. President Trump reasserted US commitment to 
FOIP in his "Indo-Pacific" visit to five Asian countries on 3-14 November 2017 (The White House, 2017). 
Thereafter, rather than onomastics, Indo-Pacific developed from a merely maritime space (Khurana, 2007) 
evolved into a strategic system rising from the rapid and stronger interconnectedness of security and economic 
issues among regions in the western Pacific and Indian ocean (Medcalf, 2014).  
The realization of FOIP contributes to rise another strategic policy namely Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(QUAD), a forum for strategic security dialogue for the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. In the time of 
ASEAN Summit 2017 in Philippines, the four leaders of the above countries agreed to revive QUAD to promote 
regional stability and peace. The "QUAD 2.0" forum confirms that there are seven main agendas: law-based 
order in Asia; freedom of navigation and flight; respect for international law; strengthening connectivity; 
maritime security; North Korea's threat and nuclear non-proliferation; and terrorism (Rai, 2018). US’s traditional 
strategic ally, Australia, has an Indo-Pacific strategy details which affiliated with FOIP, meanwhile, India’s  
Look East Policy, recently transformed to Act East Policy, has a common orientation with Japan paying serious 
attention to the strategic value of Southeast Asia and China's maneuvers in the region (Garge, 2017).  
Beijing views FOIP as a containment policy against China by the US and allies and also criticizes the 
emergence of "QUAD 2.0" as "foam in the middle of the ocean" (D. Chen, 2018; Eisentraut and Gaens, 2018). 
The geopolitical, geoeconomics and geostrategic rivalries have created unconducive political and security 
instability in the Southeast Asian region. Responding to the circumstances emerged, all ASEAN Member-States 
came to an understanding during ASEAN Summit 2019 in Thailand by adopting the ASEAN Outlook on the 
Indo-Pacific. The document is claimed to guide ASEAN member countries in conducting relations and 
cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region, and in additionally for countries outside the Southeast Asian region 
when they making interactions with ASEAN countries. Thus, the ASEAN Outlook is trying creating patterns of 
relations between ASEAN and neighboring countries that contribute to the establishment of peace, freedom, and 
prosperity (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019b).  
The adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific lifted Indonesia in the arena of global politics. 
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This Outlook was an Indonesia’s initiative submitted to ASEAN since 2018 to build an umbrella for Indo-Pacific 
cooperation with the concept of ASEAN centrality as delivered by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi in a speech 
on January 9, 2019, entitled "Indonesia: Partner for peace, security, prosperity" (Marsudi, 2018). Previously, 
Indonesia already launched the Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine to underline its influence and maritime vision 
towards the strategic position of Southeast Asia.  
This paper explains Indonesian Defense Strategy towards the Indo-Pacific strategy within the framework of 
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. In the next chapter, this article will be divided into three sections: 
explaining the Southeast Asian regional security complex after the Indo-Pacific conception was present; 
describes Indonesia's defense interest and policy towards the given regional security architecture and Indo-
Pacific, and then explain the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific as an implementation of Indonesia’s defense 
strategy. 
  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Regional Security Complex Theory 
Barry Buzan and Ole Woever in their book Regions and Powers introduce Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) to explain and predict the dynamics of a political region in its position as an international subsystem. A 
regional security complex is defined as a group of countries where most of the processes of securitization, 
securitization, or both are interconnected so that the national security problems of each country in the complex 
cannot be explained apart from each other (Buzan and Woever, 2003).  
A regional security complex is categorized within four variables to designate the complexity. First, it is the 
boundary, which distinguishes it from other security complexes. Second is an anarchic structure which means 
there are two or more autonomous units / sovereign states in the region. Next is the polarity which indicates the 
distribution of power between the security complex units. The fourth is social construction, which explains the 
pattern of amity and enmity among units. Changes to the structure above dynamically will cause a complex 
security transformation. Internal transformation is occurred in the form of integration-disintegration, ideological 
competition, and regime change due to changes in the polarity structure, anarchy structure, and social 
construction. External transformation is occurred when there is a fusion of two or more security complexes or 
the breaking up of a security complex (Buzan and Woever, 2003).  
The RSCT approach is attached importance comprehensively on account of its combining concept of 
neorealism capability distribution with the concept of securitization (security perceptions) of constructivism and 
provides an analysis portion to middle and small-power intra-regional countries in explaining the dynamics of 
security in the region. RSCT is used in a number of working literature which can be seen on an instance in 
explaining the impact of US and Russian interventions on the stability of the Central Asian region (Troitskiy, 
2015); power dynamics and stability in relations between countries in East Asia (Wirth, 2015), or the emergence 
of a new cold war phenomenon in the Middle East (Hanau Santini, 2017).  
 
2.2 Concept of Regional Governance 
Governance is understood as a process of regulating social life that can occur at the local, national, regional and 
global levels (Heywood, 2011). In the 21st century, countries deceived the anarchic international system side by 
side the multipolar or unipolar world by working together in dealing with all context emerged in the realms of 
political, economic, social and other issues in the region. Regional governance encompasses state and non-state 
actors, a set of regulations and procedures both formal and informal, and relations among actors that are 
competitive or cooperative (Jäger and Köhler, 2008). Different from the more commonly known concept of 
global governance, regional governance is limited by a group of countries that are geographically close and have 
similar interests. The well-known practice of regional government is the European Union which facilitates the 
reterritorialization of various aspects of European policy. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has survived more than half 
a century institutionalizing regional political security governance, regional economic governance, and socio-
cultural governance (Cuyvers, Chen and Lombaerde, 2019). 
 
2.3 Theory of Strategy 
A strategy is defined as the calculation of objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable risk limits to 
create results that are more profitable than results that exist by chance or are in the hands of other parties. 
(Yarger, 2006). Simply put, a strategy is defined as an act of a subject to calculate behavior based on a particular 
goal. The state is the main subject in a strategic study related to international relations (Edkins and Zehfuss, 
2014). Strategy in the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy means a set of plans and policies 
consisting of deliberate efforts by the state to utilize political, diplomatic, military and economic instruments 
together to advance the country's national interests (Feaver, 2009).  
Terry Deibel described strategy as a relationship in thought and action between means and ends, resources 
and objectives, power and purpose, capabilities and intentions in any sphere of human activity (Deibel, 2012, pp. 
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3–4). The actor acts rationally in achieving his ends that means political decision-making considerations arise 
from cost and benefit calculations. The strategic environment at a broader level determines the interests of an 
actor that causes conflicting interests as each political actor has his own choice and value system. A policymaker 
formulated a strategy to obtain benefit from the interests of his country while ensuring the other do not benefit 
from the same interests (Smith, 2011). A strategy that implemented on foreign affairs such us the case of the 
ASEAN Outlook adoption will build upon six characteristics: coherent, comprehensive, interactive, long-range, 
means sensitive, and purposeful (Deibel, 2012). 
The defense strategy places defense policy as the ends of the national strategy set by a country. The defense 
strategy can be detailed again in several forms such as general military strategy, defense diplomacy strategy, and 
management strategy and defense planning. Indonesia described the defense strategy as the integration of 
military defense and non-military defense in facing various dimensions of threats with the ultimate goal of 
securing national interests (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015b) 
  
3. Methodology 
This paper applies a qualitative methodology in the approach of a case study by developing theories and 
concepts in the analyzing process based on data collected from books, journals, and other open sources related to 
the substance discussed. 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
4.1 Regional Security Complex Parse Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia's security architecture, post-Cold War, can be categorized as a sub-complex within the Asia 
Super-complex referring to the fact that the region's connections with East and South Asia have become stronger 
(Buzan, 2003). However, this paper prefers to put Southeast Asia in the analysis as a separate regional security 
complex within its position and contention facing Indo-Pacific strategy and its trends regionally. Defining 
regional security complex parse Southeast Asian, Authors elaborate three common variables, i.e., boundary, 
polarity, and social construction.  
Generally, Southeast Asia is politically understood as a group of ASEAN member states. In the 2015 
Defense White Book, Indonesia added Timor Leste as one of its partners in the Southeast Asian region 
(Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015a). The Indo-Pacific Strategy seeks to merge Southeast Asia into a super-regional 
construction that stretches from East Asia to South Asia. The United States has also integrated a number of 
policies and strategies in this region. On May 30th, 2018, US Secretary of Defense officially renamed US Pacific 
Command (USPACOM) to US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) on a ceremony in Joint Base Pearl 
Harbor Hickam  (USINDOPACOM, 2018). This change was part of America’s defense strategy to strengthen 
leadership in Indo-Pacific region, engaged India, and countering China’s military and economic power 
projection. A further logic consequence is the relegation influence of ASEAN in defining and determining the 
direction of policy in the Southeast Asian region. 
The polarity of the Southeast Asian regional security complex can be seen as the most affected by the 
presence of the FOIP in a number of propensities. Several countries show a tendency to be close to China, others 
maintain strong partnerships with United States, and some strive to remain neutral. Some countries show an 
increase in the strategic influence of China such as Burma, Cambodia (S. A. Chen, 2018), Laos (Albert, 2019) 
and the Philippines of the Duterte era (Murphy, 2017). Meanwhile, Singapore is still the main strategic partner of 
the United States (US Department of State, 2019) and Thailand is also still the key partner of the United States in 
Southeast Asia (US Department of Defense, 2019). 
Good friendship relations have so far been maintained in Southeast Asia when compared to other regions 
such as the European Union, which is threatened with political and economic vulnerability. The principle of 
inclusive and non-intervention has a big contribution to minimizing conflict escalation among ASEAN countries. 
Based on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed by the Five ASEAN 
Founding Countries during the ASEAN Summit in Bali 1976, ASEAN seeks to maintain friendly relations 
among countries within the region by respecting each other's identity and sovereignty; implementing non-
interventions and non-threaten to one another, peaceful dispute resolution, and building effective cooperation 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1976). This agreement came to effect to all Member-states in the application of ASEAN 
principles and norms in various mechanisms and cooperation forums. All major countries had signed the treaty 
(Cuyvers, Chen and Lombaerde, 2019). After four decades, the TAC continues to find its relevance which in 
November 2019 Bahrain and Germany also signed the agreement (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019c). 
A number of the latest dynamics show tendencies to influence social construction in the Southeast Asian 
security complex. The threat perception in ASEAN has shifted to the maritime realm. The annual meeting of 
ASEAN Defense Ministers (ADMM), along with the Non-ASEAN Partners, has become a medium for 
securitization of maritime issues (Lubis, 2018). This problem is crucial since the center of gravity contestation 
the Indo-Pacific strategy vis-a-vis BRI China localized in the domain of freedom of maritime navigation and the 
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South China Sea issues. In 2016, the ASEAN Summit in Laos failed to produce any agreement due to a dispute 
over the resolution of the South China Sea dispute (Mogato, Martina and Blanchard, 2016). Maritime issues do 
have a historical record that divides ASEAN. Something similar has happened to the 21st ASEAN Summit in 
Cambodia in 2012 (Thul and Stuart Grudgings, 2012). 
 
4.2 Indonesia’s Defense Concerns and Strategy Towards Indo-Pacific 
Indonesia now is confronted with three defense issues in the Southeast Asian region: The South China Sea 
dispute, the United States strategic policy, and Chinese strategic policy (Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015a). The 
three of Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes connect the two most strategic maritime areas, the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, and the developed countries in southern hemisphere. Indonesia are not claimant states in the South 
China Sea, but recent incidents indicate that maritime disputes are still a serious concern of Indonesia's defense 
(Azizah, 2019). Not to mention, the deployment of 2500 US marines to Darwin, Australia, and planning to build 
a military base on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, will make Indonesia surrounded by US and allied military 
bases and affected by regional instability born from the maneuver. These three problems can lead to limited or 
open wars.  
Indonesia's geographical features between two oceans make Indonesia's maritime geopolitical issues 
crucial. For decades after its independence, Indonesia's geostrategic approach was still limited to unify islands 
and relations between ASEAN countries. Entering the 21st century, Indonesia expanded its maritime vision 
range to the Indian and Pacific (Indo-Pacific) oceans. Since then, Indonesia began to face demands to formulate 
its policy towards the Indo-Pacific trend.  
Indonesia views the Indo-Pacific as a prospective region because it has a lot of potentials that can be 
exploited and cooperated with. As a consequence, Indonesia considers it necessary to maintain the stability of 
the security of the area and ensure that the two maritime regions do not become a battleground for territories and 
natural resource struggles and reject the claims of maritime supremacy (Marsudi, 2019). Indonesia's struggle to 
implement its national interests in the Indo-Pacific must face the United States, China, Australia, India, and 
Japan, which also have policies on the region. Indonesia's diplomacy towards China is characterized by two 
trends: competing in geopolitics and cooperating in geoeconomics. Before Japan and the United States translated 
the region's strategic value into FOIP in the past two years, several countries have offered various approaches to 
the Indo-Pacific, including Indonesia itself. 
Since 1946, Indonesia has a foreign policy principle called the Free and Active Policy. In the defense 
context, this principle is implemented in the form of rejecting the defense alliance (Kementerian Pertahanan, 
2015a). The Indonesian constitution mandates regional and global stability as one of the cores of national 
interests. Therefore, Indonesia's defense strategy is directed to eliminates turbulences in the Southeast Asia 
region by put cooperation forward with any countries regardless of political sides  
The formulation of Indonesia's foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region was developed gradually 
starting from the Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (IPTFC), the Maritime Axis that connects 
the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept (IPCC). In 2013, Indonesia 
began to adopt the Indo-Pacific concept in line with the popularity of the term in the international geopolitical 
arena. The foreign ministry translated the concept as a crossing of two ocean regions with Indonesia placed in a 
central position (Scott, 2019).  
Indonesia sees the strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative of China, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific of 
Japan and the United States, and the East India Act undermined the ASEAN primacy on governing the high 
developing economic and great demography quantity of Southeast Asia region. The entire strategy above covers 
the strategic waters of the world in which Indonesia also has sovereignty over some of these waters. To 
accommodate these interests, Indonesia actively holds maritime diplomacy based on independent and proactive 
principles, development orientation, and rule-based approach (Kemenko Kemaritiman, 2019). 
The defense strategy that is commonly applied by countries in the Southeast Asian region when confronted 
with the rivalry of great power is Hedging Strategy. This type of strategy seeks resistance or creates 
contradictory actions as a way to minimize or mitigate weaknesses risk related to the behavior of alliances. Key 
indicators of the Hedging strategy include strengthening the military without declaring hostility, increasing 
participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of decisive balancing and bandwagoning 
efforts and strengthening of simultaneous relations with two regional powers (Murphy, 2017). 
Indonesia also adopted the same strategy when faced with the current regional and global security 
architecture. The strategy developed by Indonesia's defense diplomacy must take into account Indonesian foreign 
policy factors that adhere to the principle of free and active, limited defense capability, geostrategic position, and 
uncertain dynamics in the regional and global strategic security environment. Defense strategy within the 
framework of Indonesia's hedging strategy is a way to achieve three main agendas, namely: building mutual trust 
(confidence building), strengthening defense capability, and the development of the local defense industry 
(Gindarsah, 2016). 
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Another characteristic of Indonesia's hedging strategy is the centrality of ASEAN. Indonesia's international 
relations are mainly oriented towards interactions within the ASEAN framework. The fact that Indonesia is the 
largest country, the largest population, and one of the founding countries of ASEAN makes Indonesia always 
positioned as a natural leader in the organization. The principle of ASEAN centrality can be understood as one of 
Indonesia's ways to gather strength to form a collective balancing of large forces outside the region that can 
change the regional security architecture. Although ASEAN is unable to work further to maintain the security 
architecture due to the principle of non-intervention, ASEAN remains an instrument of diplomacy and 
Indonesia's foreign policy in Asia. ASEAN provides a strategic space while addressing the capability gap 
between the countries of Southeast Asia and large countries outside the region (Gindarsah, 2016).  
 
4.3 The ASEAN Outlook as an Implementation of Indonesia’s Strategy 
Various steps have actually been taken by Indonesia to face the Indo-Pacific strategy. In 2018, Indonesia 
introduced the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept which substantially reinforces the earlier Indo-Pacific Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation. The different values offered from this concept are ASEAN-based centrality 
approaches. Two major geopolitical upheavals in Southeast Asia namely the South China Sea dispute and 
intervention by China and the United States in intrastate and interstate ASEAN affairs have prompted Indonesia 
to build bilateral and multilateral negotiations with some ASEAN countries. Collective solutions are assumed by 
Indonesia will be able to minimize the intensity of threats to Indonesia's foreign policy vision of the Indo-Pacific 
region. However, a number of obstacles are still faced considering that ASEAN countries have not yet accepted 
the concept proposal, the scope of cooperation is still targeting ordinary security issues, and the unclear 
orientation of Indonesia's behavior to Great Power (Scott, 2019). 
Indonesia is again striving for its vision of the Indo-Pacific by circulating the Indo-Pacific insight proposal 
in May 2018 by carrying out three points: creating an international system based on international law and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts; following up on transnational issues in the region and creating an open and 
equitable economic system in the Pacific and Indian oceans (Choong, 2019). In an open forum, the Indo-Pacific 
concept of Indonesia was then presented before the ASEAN countries at the 8th East Asian Summit on 
November 8, 2018, and claimed to receive positive appreciation. A year later, Indonesia's proposal was 
successfully accepted and adopted by ASEAN as the ASEAN Outlook which is contained in the 56th point of 57 
points agreed on the results of the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019b). The results of 
the summit also called for intervention by parties outside Southeast Asia in the region should be carried out in a 
collaborative approach in certain fields that have been described in the ASEAN Outlook document. 
The Outlook stands on the principle of ASEAN centrality, inclusive, complementary, non-intervention, and 
international law-based order. Rather than directing the Indo-Pacific into a security and military approach, the 
Outlook encourages countries outside the region to partner with countries in Southeast Asia in the areas of 
economy, maritime, environment and disaster management, connectivity, and achievement of the 2030 UN 
SDG. ASEAN emphasizes the mechanism of dialogue and cooperation as a model of involvement of actors 
outside the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019a).  
The ASEAN Outlook institutes Indonesia's vision of the Indo-Pacific which is considered as the most 
inclusive compared to Japanese, Australian, Indian and of course the United States version (Gyngell, 2019). For 
Indonesia, ASEAN is not a place to confuse these variations of vision, but rather to find common ground so that 
mutual trust arises (Pramono, 2018). Indonesia rejects the realism-style approach that puts forward the concept 
of threat in international relations but instead chooses to hold all parties to become partners in cooperation.  
The preferences of the ASEAN Outlook cooperation sector very well represent the interests of Indonesia's 
foreign policy. Starting the second period of his reign, President Joko Widodo instructed that the economy be a 
central issue of future state diplomacy (Asmara, 2019). Indonesia in the last five years ago also introduced the 
doctrine of the Global Maritime Fulcrum which promotes policies to build maritime power in the Indian and 
Pacific oceans (Muhibat, 2017). The concept is the same as previous which exploited Indonesia's geographical 
superiority but this one is emphasized in the maritime sector.  
The Global Maritime Fulcrum is comprehensive as it giving birth to new concepts such as maritime 
security, maritime diplomacy, maritime economics, and maritime power (Scott, 2019). To conduct these 
complex inseparable objectives, Indonesia’s maritime affairs ministry and defense ministry, as well as foreign 
affairs ministry, have to work together and raise cooperations both at regional and international levels (Hidayat 
and Ridwan, 2017). The ASEAN Outlook is precisely answering this issue at the parallel time persuasively 
preventing Indonesia from the escalation of threats that come from geopolitical rivalry. 
ASEAN defines the Indo-Pacific as a combination of the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region 
that are interconnected and integrated, not as a single contiguous territorial unit. ASEAN emphasized that it 
would build cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, but for the Southeast Asia region, ASEAN remained as a 
central actor in determining the security and economic architecture. Penetration of actors outside the region 
which may change the architecture of the region in Southeast Asia will be responded by approaches and 
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mechanisms directed by ASEAN. Thus, the ASEAN Outlook is not a way for Indonesia to change or create new 
regional architecture. The East Asia Summit (EAS) became one of the recommended forums for consultation 
dialogue offered by the ASEAN Outlook for the scale of ASEAN and the region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019a). 
The Outlook rejects the military and security approaches that are widely socialized by the United States in order 
to shape the ideals of peace, stability, prosperity in the region. 
Table 1: Comparing US-lead Indo-Pacific Strategy vs ASEAN's Indo-Pacific approach 
Aspects INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY 
THE ASEAN OUTLOOK ON THE INDO-
PACIFIC 
Region Border 
Indo-Pacific as contiguous territorial 
space 
Indo-Pacific as an interconnected Asia-Pacific and 
Indian Ocean Region 
Main Principle Free and Open  Inclusive, Openness, ASEAN Centrality 
Interaction 
model 
Bilateral/minilateral cooperation; 
strategic alliance 
Multilateral cooperation; dialog and consultation 
Cooperation 
focus 
Security and Defense 
Economy, Maritime, Connectivity, Human 
Development 
In the defense sector, ASEAN already has a multilateral ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) 
forum that discusses and elaborates defense issues and policies among ASEAN countries and regional partners. 
The skepticism about the effectiveness of ASEAN in governing defense interests can be denied by the presence 
of ADMM as a practical multilateralism (Tan, 2018). Even though defense issue is not in the recommendation 
cooperation sector, the ADMM offers a multilateral approach with details of the program based on local issues 
of the Southeast Asian region and without the tendency of strategic alliances which makes it very relevant to be 
applied within the framework of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia's defense strategy through 
ADMM is aimed at building confidence that will shift the pattern of enmity relations to amity and become an 
instrument for introducing Indonesian defense equipment and conveying interest and vision of Indonesia's 
defense in the region (Lubis, 2018; Rusfiana, 2018). 
Indonesia's active maneuver to pass the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is seen as Indonesia's 
defensive stance to defend its security and political interests in the Asia Pacific region. Indonesia is utilizing its 
central influence in ASEAN to foster collaboration among small countries in Southeast Asia. The final product 
of this collaboration is to increase Indonesia's relative power to balance the power of the United States in 
Southeast Asia. Indonesia took the initiative to create a system that has mechanisms and norms to fight US 
aggressiveness. Using ASEAN as an instrument is Indonesia's rational move because Indonesia will get enough 
power to maintain the security posture of the Southeast Asian region. Although the ASEAN Outlook is neither 
an agreement nor binding (Acharya, 2019) the successful adoption of the following document reflects progress 
in achieving Indonesia's defense strategy agenda towards Southeast Asia's regional security architecture.  
    
5. Conclusion 
The Indo-Pacific Strategy is part of the big agenda of rebalancing policy in Asia rolled out by the United States. 
The existence of the Indo-Pacific slowly changes the architecture of the security complex of the Southeast Asian 
region which will create a strategic space that benefits the US and its allies. The potential transformation of the 
security complex impacts all countries in the region, including Indonesia. 
Indonesia in the past decade has implemented a hedging strategy to deal with the changing trends in the 
regional and global strategic security environment. Challenges arise from the penetration of strategies and 
visions of great powers outside the region that can change the security architecture of the Southeast Asian 
region. However, Indonesia needs a stable region to support the achievement of national goals. 
The long-initiated Indo-Pacific strategy began to show very significant developments in 2017 which were 
also accompanied by the revival of the QUAD strategic security dialogue. The motivation to counteract the 
strategy of BRI China has resulted in intense geopolitical feuds in the Southeast Asian region, which is currently 
the belle of the international political constellation. 
The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is Indonesia's defense strategy to maintain the architecture of the 
security complex of the Southeast Asian region. The outputs of the principles, mechanisms, and orientations 
emphasized by the Outlook minimize or slow down the transformation of the security complex which will 
impact destabilization. Indonesia's vital position in ASEAN is utilized by submitting the Outlook proposal and 
then successfully adopted by ASEAN. 
The ASEAN Outlook was proposed in such a way as to maximize the centrality of ASEAN without 
rejecting the involvement of actors outside the region. The fusion of Southeast Asia's geopolitical construction 
into a large region stretching from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean will diminish Indonesia's influence, 
given that Indonesia's existence in international relations depends on its active maneuver in ASEAN. The 
interaction model offered in the form of cooperation and dialogue will lead to social construction in a region 
dominated by friendly relations rather than hostilities. 
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